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This paper provides evidence for spillovers in learning and
behavior within urban slums in Chandigarh, India. In an experi-
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day-care centers were provided recipe books to lower their price
per calorie. Theory suggests that if learning takes place among
untreated mothers in the same slum cluster, it may increase
or decrease their food expenditure. Results from a di¤erence-
in-di¤erences analysis show that nutritional knowledge increases
among untreated mothers and there is a corresponding reduction
in food expenditure. These neighbouring mothers exhibit learn-
ing spillovers and a reduction in expenditure regardless of their
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1 Introduction
Information dissemination a¤ects knowledge, investments and outcomes
and this in turn may have wide-ranging consequences (Reinikka and
Svensson, 2005; Banerjee et al., 2010). If change in the information
available to a household member changes her level of knowledge and in
turn her behavior, then it is vital to understand if this would inuence
other households. In this paper, I provide empirical evidence on how
an informational treatment to an individual shapes the behavior of her
neighbors. In particular, I nd the presence of positive inter-household
spillovers in learning and also on behavior.
The treatment involved specic nutritional information in the form
of recipe books custom-designed for mothers living in urban slums in
Chandigarh, India where child malnutrition (as per WHO standards)
was very high at 35 percent. The information was imparted to mothers
who have their children enrolled in day care centers or Anganwadisrun
by the Government of India. In each of these centers, there is a child
care worker whose role includes advising the mother on child nutrition
by making home visits1. Informational treatment in this context aims
to decrease the price per calorie for the mother by giving her a list of
economical and nutritious recipes.
Despite the government program having been in place for 35 years
and now spanning over 1 million centers, child malnutrition in India is
at 37 percent amongst children up to 5 years of age (DHS, 2005). Sen
(2005) argues that it is surprising that those at the poverty line do not
buy more calories as they could easily a¤ord the calories within their
food budget if they had the same food purchasing patterns as those
below the poverty line2. Mothers seem to lack nutritional knowledge as
65 percent of the mothers interviewed at baseline did not know that the
recommended number of meals for children under 6 is 5-6 times a day and
their average nutritional quiz score was 25% less than that of the child
care worker. However, if spillover e¤ects are important, then targeting
a sub-sample of mothers with nutritional information may achieve an
increase in knowledge of neighboring mothers as well.
1The other main role of the child care worker is to allocate mid-day meals to
children in the Anganwadi.
2In urban areas of India, there was little change in average calorie consumption
between 1983-2005 despite rising per capita incomes with little change in the price
of calories relative to other commodities (Deaton and Dreze, 2008). Deaton and
Subramanian (1996) calculate that the poor consume slightly less than 1400 calories
per day. This is 1000 calories short of the recommended intake. It is important to
note that less than 1% of the rural households report lack of food in the state of
Punjab, of which Chandigarh is the capital (Deaton and Dreze, 2008).
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To identify spillover e¤ects, we compare treated mothers from se-
lected Anganwadis (child day-care centers) to untreated mothers from
the remaining Anganwadis in the same cluster both pre and post the
informational treatment3. Moreover, to account for the natural changes
in outcomes over the time period that would have occurred even with-
out the treatment, a comparable set of Anganwadis within the same city
(but in a geographically separate block) act as a control group. This
also controls for seasonality e¤ects, city-wide shocks to food prices and
any other unobservables that would similarly impact all groups. How-
ever, there would be two main identifying assumptions in applying the
di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis: rst, the treated mothers do not follow
di¤erential trends in behavior or knowledge as compared to the untreated
mothers in the same slum cluster prior to the treatment. Second, the
treated mothersoutcomes do not follow di¤erent pre-treatment trends
relative to those in the control group. I nd that the treated and un-
treated mothers in the same cluster are ex-ante similar to each other on
all observables and also to the control group. However, I cannot check
for pre-existing trends in knowledge or behavior4.
By measuring spillovers, we can evaluate the e¤ectiveness of informa-
tion campaigns in a¤ecting the health behavior of neighbors. In partic-
ular, untreated mothers in the same cluster as treated mothers exhibit
changes in (i) nutritional knowledge, (ii) childs dietary intake and (iii)
food expenditure. Finally, the paper tests for any spillovers on child
health as measured by weight-for-age z-scores.
Theoretically, the impact on food expenditure for the spillover group
is ambiguous. The recipe book may increase or decrease food expendi-
ture depending on the direct e¤ect through a fall in price per calorie and
indirect e¤ect through a rise in calorie intake. I nd that nutritional
knowledge increases as measured by a multiple-choice quiz administered
on the mothers. Moreover, the increase in nutritional knowledge in the
spillover group is limited to questions related directly to the informa-
tional treatment and not to out-of-book questions. Corresponding to
the increase in nutritional knowledge, we observe a reduction in food
expenditure for the spillover group. But there is no e¤ect on reducing
child malnutrition. This is not surprising, as there was also no impact on
improving health of children whose mothers were directly treated with
information (Singh, 2011a). There seems to be no existing research on
3For details on how the Anganwadis were selected, please see the Methodology
section.
4Nevertheless, to test for spillover e¤ects on child weight, the pre-existing linear
trends in all the groups can be checked because of recorded weight data prior to
baseline. I do not nd any evidence of di¤erential trends in weight.
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the extent of learning and behavioral externalities in health arising out
of a nutritional information campaign.
It is also relevant to test if these e¤ects may be di¤erent for di¤er-
ently educated household members. For example, do literate mothers
gain more from an informational treatment? It may be the case that
literate mothers are able to read the printed information or they have
higher retention capacity making them more amenable to receive new
information. A priori, it is not clear if there would be any impact of the
treatment on child health for mothers who cannot read. For example,
neighbors or literate husbands can teach uneducated mothers from the
recipe book. I nd no evidence of intra-household knowledge transfer
from a literate father to a treated illiterate mother. Nevertheless, illiter-
ate mothers do show an increase in their knowledge when treated with
the recipe book and there also emerge learning spillovers on untreated
illiterate mothers in the same slum. This provides suggestive evidence
that illiterate treated mothers may learn by asking neighboring mothers
while illiterate untreated mothers may increase nutritional knowledge if
their neighbors are treated.
The literature on the impact of informational campaigns is plagued
with self-selection issues5. Individuals could self-select into network
groups based on their characteristics. However, I nd the ex-ante observ-
able characteristics of mothers between the di¤erent groups to be very
similar and it is important to keep in mind that they are all mothers as-
sociated with similar Anganwadis in slum areas in the same city. There
are almost no issues of self-selection within the treated and untreated
groups as compliance among mothers is close to 95 percent and similar
across all groups. There may be a bias in measuring spillover e¤ects if
social group formation is endogenous (Manski, 1993). However, in my
setting, this is not a concern on the extensive margin as the relevant
spillover group is geographically separated from the control group and
there are no reported migrations between the control clusters and other
clusters containing both the treated and untreated Anganwadis. On the
intensive margin, within slum clusters, mothers with recipe books may
encourage formation of new peer groups but this cannot be addressed
in the present study as I study spillovers only on mothers living in the
same cluster who send their children to untreated Anganwadis.
This paper is related to three strands of research. First, it relates to
the nascent literature on spillover e¤ects in public health. Although, it
5For example, Siegel and Biener (2000) and Hsieh et al. (1994) construct treat-
ment and control groups based on recall exposure to media when they study the
e¤ect of an anti-smoking media campaign on smoking behavior. This methodology
may su¤er from a bias if recall exposure is dependent on if a person smokes or not.
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is rare to detect presence of an externality in public health interventions,
Miguel and Kremer (2004) showed treatment externalities of deworming
on child health. Godlonton and Thornton (2011) incentivized individuals
for HIV testing and found positive learning spillovers on their neighbors.
This is in line with results showing inuence on peers to use contracep-
tion, menstrual cups and utilizing health services (Speizer et. al., 2001;
Oster and Thornton, 2011; Deri, 2005). Chaudhuri (2009) nds posi-
tive spillovers of a health education program for mothers and children in
Bangladesh on the health of untreated elderly women in the same house-
hold. Thus, the current literature focuses either on learning, behavioral
or nal health outcomes, whereas in this paper, I study all three out-
comes6. My results conrm inter-household spillovers on knowledge and
food expenditure but not on weight and these e¤ects are similar to the
e¤ects observed in treated households. A priori, informational spillovers
may not always lead to similar behavior7.
Another strand deals with how individual decisions depend upon the
choices of others in the same social network, where these individuals
are usually prot-maximizing farmers (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Con-
ley and Udry, 2010). Their results are di¤erent but do emphasize the
importance of social networks in learning8.
Third, several studies show the complementarity between being ed-
ucated and beneting from information campaigns that lead to an in-
crease in the knowledge gap between the informed and the less informed
(Tichenor et al., 1970; Kwak, 1999; Nadeau et al., 2008). My re-
sults are consistent with these studies as literate mothers seem to gain
more knowledge from the informational treatment. However, learning
spillovers act to reduce this informational gap between the treated and
the untreated in the same cluster.
This paper will not be able to address the minimum number of
mothers that should be targeted by the information treatment to attain
spillovers to achieve the highest benet-cost ratio. It can only provide
evidence for the existence of spillovers in learning and health outcomes
given a specic level of treatment in a specic geographical setting. As
spillovers may have scale e¤ects depending on how many mothers in the
6Snyder (2007) points out in his review on the impact of informational campaigns
that it is not known how successful nutritional campaigns are at changing the inter-
mediate outcome of knowledge.
7Although, Duo and Saez (2003) nd positive informational spillovers in a pen-
sion scheme, Duo et al. (2007) show no social learning e¤ects in fertilizer use.
Moreover, having peers who have been treated with deworming lowers the personal
likelihood of getting dewormed (Kremer and Miguel, 2007).
8However, it is not necessary that their results should also hold true within a
household as a mother may intrinsically care for her child to be healthy.
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slum are being treated, it is clearly not possible to generalize for di¤erent
intensities of treatment within a geographical area. Similarly, it cannot
assess whether information should be imparted by print (newspapers
and magazines) or electronic media (radio and television) to maximize
spillovers as it considers only one informational treatment in urban slum
clusters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the details of
the experiment. Section 3 develops a conceptual framework. Section
4 describes the specication and core results. Section 5 reports how
spillover e¤ects vary according to mothers literacy. Section 6 concludes.
2 Experiment
2.1 Background
The research project involved performance pay to child care workers
and the recipe treatment to mothers in separate geographical blocks.
In this paper, I focus on the recipe treatment and the "leftover group"
from the informational block, or the spillover group. Figure 1 depicts
the locations of the Anganwadis in the recipe treatment, spillover group
and control group centers. There are 36, 20 and 36 centers in each
group respectively, with the recipe and spillover centers being part of
one administrative block and the control being part of another as shown.
I assess the extent of informational spillovers between mothers sending
their children to di¤erent Anganwadis but located within the same slum
area.
2.2 Methodology
Matching was resorted to for selecting Anganwadis for both the recipe
treatment and the control group. In December 2009, data on malnu-
trition rates at the Anganwadi-level was collected from the local Health
Department. Chandigarh has 370 Anganwadis divided into 3 blocks. All
workers were provided a performance-pay incentive in one block (Block
1). A total of 36 centres were selected from Block 3 to receive the recipe
book treatment and 36 centres were selected from Block 2 to act as
control. These groups were selected by an algorithm that matched the
malnutrition averages of centres from Block 2 and 3 to that of Block 19.
Similarly, the control group centers were also selected by matching on
9The matching was conducted on the average malnutrition rate of Block 1 because
all the 73 Anganwadis in this block needed to be assigned the incentive treatment
for optimal power.
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the average of this block10. The matching exercise served two purposes:
rst, it allowed selection of 36 centers in each group to attain optimal
power. Second, it made the selection of the control group comparable
to other treatments, as here, the matched and unmatched centers were
signicantly di¤erent in their average malnutrition rates.
It is thus, an empirical question whether those that were left un-
matched were signicantly di¤erent in observables from the matched. If
the matched and unmatched centers are ex-ante similar, the spillover
e¤ects of the recipe treatment can be inferred from the changes in out-
comes in the unmatched group relative to control using di¤erence-in-
di¤erences. This interpretation rests on the identication assumption
that there are no time varying e¤ects that are correlated with the treat-
ment (common trend assumption). In other words, rst, the treated
mothers do not follow di¤erential trends in behavior or knowledge as
compared to the untreated mothers in the same slum cluster prior to
the treatment. Second, the treated mothers outcomes do not follow
di¤erent pre-treatment trends relative to those in the control group.
2.3 Implementation
To design the recipe book, ten simple cost-e¤ective recipes were selected
from the Governments publicly available book on Nutritious Recipes
for Complementary Feeding of Young Children. The recipes use only
locally available ingredients and were attractively designed and printed
in the vernacular (Hindi). Each recipe was rich in calories and could
be easily made at home within a budget of Rs. 4 for 150 gms11. The
book contained information on ingredients, step-by-step instructions and
nutritive value (calories, protein, iron and carotene) for each preparation.
Figure A1 in the Appendix illustrates a recipe from the book. Two
clear aims of the recipe book were to rst, reduce the price per calorie
incurred by the mother by increasing her knowledge of nutritious recipes
and second, to improve the communication between the mother and the
child care worker12.
It also had information on hygiene and good food habits and high-
10The control group was selected from Block 2 because the selected group had less
variance in inter-Anganwadi malnutrition than the group from Block 3 and Block 1.
This assignment would allow us to test for heterogeneous treatment e¤ects. Block 1
was selected for the incentive treatment because it had the most number of Angan-
wadis.
11This was calculated by the local Nutritionist, Food and Nutrition Board (Rs. 4
= 9 cents).
12Apart from the worker being able to use the recipes as a reference point, each
page had boxes at the bottom which mothers were asked to tick when they prepared
that particular recipe.
7
lighted food items rich in calories, protein, iron and carotene. At base-
line, only 45 percent of the mothers could read but they were given the
book even if they could not. Also, 73 percent of the fathers were literate
as reported by the mother. The informational environment is such that
the workers know that the mothers are getting the book and the mothers
also know that the workers are aware of this fact.
In April 2010, a team of nine enumerators weighed children on digital
weighing machines and interviewed mothers of these children13. Weights
were recorded before the mid-day meal and it was ensured that children
were not in heavy clothing. The interviews were taken by calling mothers
to the Anganwadi at specied times. Enumerators collected information
on demographics of the household, diet of the child and mother-worker
interaction. A quiz was administered to judge the nutritional knowledge
of all the mothers and the worker. The multiple-choice quiz for mothers
had 5 questions (worth 13 points because of multiple answers per ques-
tion) that could be answered by reading the recipe book. The next 4
questions (worth 7 points) were "out-of-book". Mothers in the recipe
treatment were provided with the recipe book after they were quizzed,
whereas mothers in the spillover or control group did not get the book.
Enumerators also noted the previous weight recorded in registers for
each child.
A window of 3 months was chosen for the experiment because it is
the average time duration between two medical check-ups by the local
Health Department. The duration was veried to be su¢ cient for a
grade improvement to occur by doctors at the local o¢ ce of the Health
Department, Government of India.
The second round of the experiment was conducted in July 2010.
The children were weighed again and questionnaires re-administered to
mothers.
2.4 Compliance and attrition
Table 1 shows the compliance and attrition rates. There were 36 Angan-
wadis each in the recipe and control groups and the remaining untreated
20 centers from the recipe block formed the spillover group. At baseline
and at endline, on average 96 percent of the children weighed also had
their mothers quizzed, indicating a high compliance rate. High com-
pliance mitigates the concern that there is a selection bias in certain
types of mothers being quizzed and given the recipe book. Moreover,
high compliance is observed for all groups addressing the possibility of
13Enumerators were trained and supervised by me on the ground throughout the
experiment. The weighing machines used in both rounds were re-used for the same
set of children for accuracy.
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systematic selection of di¤erent types of mothers in di¤erent groups and
strengthening internal validity. A total of 2632 children were weighed
twice in the treatment, spillover and control groups. The attrition rate
was 13 percent for the children. which is considered normal as children
leave the day-care centers for admission in schools or if the family mi-
grates. In Table A1, the observable characteristics of the attrited sample
from baseline show insignicant normalized di¤erences relative to con-
trol for almost all relevant variables14. Also, there is no movement of
children between centers (even within the same cluster) as the same set
of children for each Anganwadi are covered in the two rounds.
2.5 Summary statistics
Table 2 lists the summary statistics from the recipe, spillover and con-
trol groups as well as the normalized di¤erences between them. We nd
that in the recipe and spillover groups, the average z-score and malnutri-
tion rates are insignicantly di¤erent from the control group. Similarly,
the average age of a child is about four years and four months and the
mother is just over 28 years old. On average, the household income is
slightly lower in the recipe and spillover groups relative to the control at
around $75 a month15. Also, fridge ownership in the recipe and spillover
groups is half of that in the control. Close to 75 percent of all mothers
are housewives16. Close to 70 percent of the households own a mobile
phone, but less than 4 percent own a water lter in the recipe treatment.
At baseline, the mothers average nutritional knowledge score as mea-
sured by a quiz is 12.4 compared to 15 for the Anganwadi workers. The
normalized di¤erences show that on the whole, the observable statistics
are very similar across all groups barring ownership of fridge17.
In terms of diet, more than 80 percent of the mothers provide milk
and green vegetables at least twice a week to their children. However,
more than 50 percent are unable to give their children fruits and only
11 percent give traditional sweets that are rich in calories and less than
10 percent provide non-vegetarian food with a frequency of two times
a week. On average, households report spending 52 percent of their
income on food.
14Only quiz score in the recipe treatment and income in spillover group have sig-
nicant normalized di¤erences of 0.29 and 0.27 respectively.
15Assuming 1$=Rs. 45.
16Housewife is a dummy equal to 1 for those mothers who identify themselves as
housewives and who do not work outside the home.
17The infrastructure in the Anganwadi centres (blackboard, chart, toilet, drinking
water, electricity) are very similar across all groups and wages of workers are identical.
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3 Conceptual framework
One of the aims of the recipe book was to reduce the price per calorie (p).
I assume that the recipe treatment leads to a decrease in p: The mother
maximizes her utility, u = u(h; n) where h is the health of her child and
n is the consumption of other household items. The health function of
the child is h(q) where q is the number of calories her child receives.
Assume @h
@q
= hq > 0. She faces a budget constraint: pq + pon  m:
Here, po is the price and n the quantity of all other goods.
Assume, u = hn1 ; we solve for the maximization problem and nd
@q
@p
at the optimum. As the total expenditure on calories by a household
is p:q, the change in expenditure due to a change in p can be expressed
as follows after plugging in @q
@p
at the optimum found earlier:
The change in expenditure can be expressed as follows:
4E=  4pm
p(1 + h (1 )

)| {z } + q4p|{z}
indirect e¤ect direct e¤ect (1)
where
h =
h:hqq
h2q
This means that when there is a fall in price per calorie, 4E will
be positive or negative depending on whether the direct e¤ect is domi-
nated by the indirect e¤ect or not. The indirect e¤ect makes the food
expenditure increase as the household nds it cheaper to feed calories,
thereby increasing their consumption. The direct e¤ect reduces the food
expenditure because the price is reduced per calorie. It is unclear which
of the two e¤ects is likely to be stronger in the treatment and spillover
groups. One can imagine an extreme case where the indirect e¤ect dom-
inates the direct e¤ect for the recipe group leading to an increase in
expenditure, whereas the reverse happens for the spillover group. For
this to occur, the recipe books second aim of improving communica-
tion needs to be analyzed further. Assume initially that the recipe book
leads to a decline in price per calorie for both the treatment and spillover
groups. Note that learning from treated mothers may allow the workers
to communicate more e¤ectively with spillover group mothers. However,
having the recipe book physically is also likely to be important. This is
because the recipe book can be used to monitor and remind the moth-
ers on cooking recipes. The use of the recipe book as a reference by
the worker on her home visits makes the mother-worker communication
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more e¤ective as found in Singh (2011a). If the recipe book allows the
worker to communicate better with the treated mother leading to more
caloric recipes being cooked, expenditure may actually increase for the
recipe treatment and decrease for the spillover group18. This happens
because the indirect e¤ect dominates the direct e¤ect in equation (2).
4 Empirical specication and results
4.1 Empirical Specication
The baseline regression specication for nding learning and spillover
e¤ects on learning is as follows:
qijt = (post)t + (recipe)j + (spillover)j + (post  recipe)jt +
(post  spillover)jt +Xijt + "ijt
qijt is the quiz score of mother of child i in Anganwadi j at time t.
The variable post is a dummy that is 0 for baseline and 1 for endline. The
variables recipe is 1 if the child is in the recipe treatment and 0 otherwise.
Xijt encompasses individual and Anganwadi specic controls19. The
error term is clustered by Anganwadi. The variable post accounts for
the natural increase in knowledge in 3 months, all seasonal e¤ects on
knowledge, regional shocks in levels of information (through for example,
radio and print advertisements on health) and any management changes
or unobservables that would impact all groups in the same way.  and
 are the baseline di¤erences between the recipe and spillover groups
and the control.  and  are the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for
the learning and spillover e¤ects with the underlying common trends
assumption.
4.2 Knowledge
Table 3 shows the spillovers on learning of providing the recipe book.
Learning is proxied by a quiz score as measured by a 20 point mothers
quiz implemented at baseline and endline. The spillover group shows
strong learning spillovers. It has an increase in the quiz score which
is comparatively smaller compared to the increase in the recipe treat-
ment but still high and signicant. This suggests that there was direct
learning from the recipe book as well as learning spillovers. The quiz
contained two sections: a 13 point section that could be answered by
18One possible theoretical channel through which better communication will
strengthen the indirect e¤ect may be increasing  for the mother when the worker
uses the recipe book as a reference point for training the mother.
19It also includes individual dummies for other treatments implemented during
the study in another block (incentivej and combinedj) as well as their interactions
with post: See Singh (2011a) for details of these treatments. This has been done to
improve e¢ ciency but makes no di¤erence to our estimates.
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reading the recipe book and a general 7 point non-recipe section. It is
important to note that the increase in the spillover group is from the
recipe score section (as in the direct treatment) giving further impetus
to the mechanism that strong informational learning and spillovers took
place because of the recipe book. As an additional robustness check, all
mothers at endline were asked if they had learnt any new recipes from
other mothers in the previous month. I nd that 41% and 30% more
mothers report learning a new recipe from other mothers in the recipe
and spillover group respectively relative to control.
4.3 Diet
In Table 4, the results are from a regression that has the variable food
item intake for the child as the dependent variable which is 1 if this
item has been consumed at least twice a week on average in the last
three months (as reported by the mother). We observe that on average
there is no signicant impact of the recipe treatment on the consump-
tion of green vegetables or eggs for both the recipe and spillover groups.
However, there is a signicant increase in porridge consumption in the
spillover group indicating spillovers on behavior. This is consistent with
learning spillovers and also higher porridge intake in the recipe treat-
ment20. There are three potential explanations for the higher porridge
coe¢ cient for the spillover group: rst, the baseline di¤erence in porridge
diet is also higher in the recipe group relative to the spillover group, indi-
cating a catch-up e¤ect. Second, in the spillover group, the proportional
increase in porridge consumption is not higher in magnitude relative to
the proportional increase in sweets in the recipe treatment (28 percent
increase over the baseline for the spillover group compared to a 41 per-
cent increase in sweet consumption for the recipe book even though the
latter is insignicantly di¤erent from 0). This may suggest di¤erent sub-
stitution between the di¤erent diets in the recipe and spillover groups.
The recipe book does contain a recipe for the porridge and it is rela-
tively simple to make, but as six out of the ten recipes can be classied
as sweets, it is a little surprising to see no signicant increase in the
consumption of sweets in the recipe group21. Third, the substitution
between cheap recipes like porridge and relatively more expensive items
like sweets can be illustrated with how diet changes as a child has more
20There appears to be a greater di¤erence between the two groups in increasing
traditional sweet intake (higher for recipe group) and porridge (higher for spillover
group), but these di¤erences are insignicant.
21In Singh (2011a), the increase in consumption of sweets only takes place when
recipes to mothers are combined with performance-pay incentives to workers as the
workers are then more likely to make personalized visits to the homes of the mothers
to teach them about specic recipes.
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siblings (from Figures in Appendix A2 and A3)22.
4.4 Food expenditure
We observe in Table 5 that there was a signicant reduction in food ex-
penditure in the recipe and spillover groups. The increase in knowledge
in the spillover group as well as the recipe treatment lends credibility
to this result being at least partly because of the informational transfer
from the recipe book. It implies that it is not imitation of their neigh-
bors that is driving the result in the spillover group but strong learning
and behavioral spillovers23.
We also note that the reduction in food expenditure is much greater
for the spillover group in magnitude, although the di¤erence is not signif-
icant due to coe¢ cients being imprecisely estimated. One reason could
be that for the recipe book treatment, there appears to be better com-
munication between the mother and the worker, wherein the worker
reminds and monitors mothers with the aid of the recipe book. There
is weak evidence for supporting this argument in the sub-section in the
Appendix in Table A5. The indirect e¤ect from mother-worker commu-
nication should in turn lead to an increase in caloric food (especially
traditional desserts), but there appears to be no signicant increase in
its consumption in the recipe treatment, even though its coe¢ cient is
much larger than that in the spillover group. Thus, one reason why
the food expenditure decrease is greater for the spillover group is that
mothers shift to extremely low-cost food (like porridge) whereas in the
treatment group they shift towards recipes with lower price per calorie
but relatively higher cost (e.g. sweets).
4.5 Weight
Table 6 illustrates the results for the nal health outcomes: weight,
grade, z-score and malnutrition status. We nd that there are no spillovers
on the weight of the child, her malnutrition grade, z-score or the like-
22At endline, recipe treatment mothers were asked how many times they cooked
each recipe. The responses suggested that the three most popular recipes from the
book were Suji Halwa (traditional Indian dessert), Khichdi (Rice-Lentil gruel) and
Dalia (Porridge).
23One possible explanation for this reduction in food expenditure could be a change
in actual market food prices in the treatment block relative to the control group. This
would not have anything to do with the treatment. However, I collected data on
market prices for major food items (milk, fruits, vegetables, cereals, sweets, chicken)
for each cluster at endline and found no signicant price di¤erences between slum
clusters for any food item. Moreover, the relatively small geographical area with
good transport infrastructure in the city would make any price discrepancies between
clusters minimal.
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lihood of being malnourished. The result is robust to including a vast
array of controls. This shows that on average providing recipe books to
mothers has no direct impact on the weight of her child or the child of
the same slum-dwelling mothers.
The result may be somewhat surprising in the light of an increase in
porridge consumption in both groups. However, an increase in the intake
of porridge increase does not necessarily imply that the weight should go
up. There could be a threshold of energy intake that may be necessary
to cross for the weight to increase. When workers were incentivized
without mothers receiving the recipe book, there was an increase in the
intake of caloric sweets but the weight did not improve (Singh, 2011a).
However, it is possible that the weight may go up in the long run, as we
do not really know the time it takes for a dietary increase to translate to
a signicant weight increase. Moreover, there may be other food items
that the mother may be substituting with porridge that are not captured
in our analysis. Similarly, the weight in the short run in the spillover
group does not appear to be correlated with knowledge as is the case
with the recipe treatment, where the knowledge increases but the weight
does not.
5 Heterogeneity
The heterogeneity specication for nding learning and spillover e¤ects
of literate mothers on learning outcomes is as follows:
qijt = (post)t +
P
k k(treatmentk)j + (literate)i +
P
k k(post 
treatmentk)jt + (post  literate)it +
P
k k(literate  treatmentk)jt +P
k !k(literate  post  treatmentk)ijt +Xijt + "ijt
As usual, post is a dummy that is 0 for baseline and 1 for endline.
The variable treatmentk are the individual treatment dummies: recipe
and spillover24. The dummy treatment is 1 if the child is in the specic
treatment and 0 otherwise. Xijt includes individual and Anganwadi
specic controls. To test the hypothesis that the recipe treatment has an
impact on knowledge for literate mothers, we need to test if 1+!1 = 0;
where k = 1 for the recipe treatment.
5.1 Literate mother
It is important to understand how the information spreads to other
mothers in the vicinity. Does it depend on whether the mother is literate
24Including or excluding the observations from other treatments implemented in
the project to a separate block does not make a di¤erence to the interpretation of any
of our results. These have been included in the background for improving e¢ ciency
but the gains are very minimal and results are extremely robust to only focusing on
recipe and spillover groups.
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or not? If it does, then the spillovers may suggest that literate mothers
share information only with other literate mothers in the slum area or
even if they interact with illiterate mothers, these mothers may not be
able to retain and apply the information. If it does not, it may mean
that information transfer is not restricted to literate mothers. Indeed,
this would be of policy relevance, especially because this would imply
that printed information can trickle down to even those who cannot read
it.
Table 7 provides evidence for the heterogeneous impacts on weight-
for-age z-scores, knowledge and food expenditure of a mother being lit-
erate. The direct impact in learning appears to be much greater for
literate as compared to illiterate mothers. In the spillover group, learn-
ing takes place to a similar degree for both literate and illiterate moth-
ers. A literate mothers quiz score is signicantly higher relative to
an illiterate mother if she is in the recipe treatment but not if she is
in the spillover group. This implies that the nutritional knowledge in-
crease happens on average for both literate and illiterate mothers in the
spillover group. The sum of the coe¢ cients on Post*Recipe and Mother
can read*Post*Recipe is signicantly di¤erent from 0 for quiz score at
the 1 percent signicance level. However, informational spillovers on
learning of same-slum dwelling mothers are not restricted to them be-
ing literate. This suggests that social networking among mothers in
the same slum matters and information is transferred through verbal
communication. There could be two channels of informational trans-
fer. First, illiterate mothers may ask neighboring literate mothers or
their Anganwadi worker to read out recipes. Second, literate moth-
ers may share information with both literate and illiterate mothers. I
nd some evidence for the rst channel to be active as the informa-
tional increase in the recipe treatment is 0.82 points for illiterate but
1.78 points for literate mothers in the quiz. Moreover, it appears not
to go through the worker but through literate mothers because there is
no di¤erential increase in communication between the worker and the
illiterate mother receiving the treatment. But, the second channel is
clearly demonstrated by an increase in the quiz score of the spillover
mothers regardless of them being literate. Another mechanism by which
the mothers in the spillover groups may get their information may be
through their Anganwadi workers (who talk with workers or mothers
from treated Anganwadis). However, I do not observe an increase in the
quiz scores of the workers from treated or spillover Anganwadis.
The consistency of the result that having literate mother at home
matters for both knowledge and health is in contrast to having a literate
father at home as shown in Table A2. There are very small increases in
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quiz scores for treated mothers if fathers are literate, which may indicate
the presence of transaction costs within a household that prohibit infor-
mational transfer either because the literate father does not read to the
mother (who also cooks the food) or the illiterate mother does not seek
his advice or if there is transfer, then she is unable to retain what she is
taught because of lower retentive capacity for information25. The latter
channel is unlikely given that there appear to be informational spillovers
from literate to illiterate mothers within a slum. Moreover, social net-
works within slum clusters as opposed to fathers seem to be responsible
for the 0.82 point increase observed for illiterate treated mothers, further
strengthening the rst channel in the previous paragraph.
In line with the above results, we nd that food expenditure is re-
duced across the board for literate and illiterate mothers in the spillover
group, but there is a premium in the recipe treatment of being literate
in reducing expenditure on food. Thus, nutritional information cam-
paigns may have di¤erential direct e¤ects for literate mothers increasing
the knowledge gap between the literate and the illiterate in the treated
group. As discussed in the Introduction, this is in line with the existing
literature on information campaigns. However, spillovers appear to be
less heterogeneous in both learning and behavior26.
A related policy implication is that if the mother can read, she is able
to raise the z-score of her child if she gets the recipe book. The direct
impact on learning for literate mothers also corresponds to a decrease
of about 4.5 percent in the probability of child being categorized as
malnourished according to the Anganwadi norms. The coe¢ cients have
the same sign but are smaller and insignicant if malnutrition is classied
according to WHO Reference (2007). This implies that the children who
seem to gain most are those who are mildly malnourished according to
the Anganwadis and those whose mothers are literate27.
25In line with this result, there seems to be no complementarity in learning if both
the mother and the father can read. If we had also been able to test the fathers nu-
tritional knowledge, we would have been able to check if the communication channels
are closed from father to mother or vice versa. It was not possible due to budget and
time constraints.
26As the channel of behavioral change is through diet of the child at home, we can
expect that the technology of food production may also have heterogeneous treatment
and spillover e¤ects. I test for this in the Appendix using kitchen assets ownership
as a proxy for food production technology and nd heterogeneity in treatment e¤ects
but not for spillovers.
27If the weight is between 70-80% of the median weight-for-age, the child is clas-
sied as mildly malnourished. The WHO Reference (2007) makes use of z-scores to
classify malnutrition.
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6 Conclusion
Health interventions often have unintended consequences. Detecting the
extent and kind of externalities may be very relevant for shaping public
health policy. However, very little is known about the spillovers asso-
ciated with nutritional information campaigns. I test for spillovers in
behavior and learning in the specic context of nutritional information
dissemination through recipe books in urban slums. These appears to
generate on average no positive spillovers on the malnutrition status of
a child in the short run. But, if the policy maker cares about improving
general nutritional knowledge and reducing food expenditure for house-
holds at the poverty line living in urban slums, the information campaign
is e¤ective and there is evidence of strong externalities on learning and
behavior for other households within the same slum cluster28. In par-
ticular, the quiz score of neighboring mothers increases. The increase in
the quiz score is signicant and is driven by the component of the quiz
directly related to the recipe book. There are also spillovers on intake of
porridge, which improves without any observable decline in other foods.
Thus, this paper provides one of the rst pieces of evidence on how
spillovers in both learning and behavior can take place of an informa-
tion campaign. Moreover, the empirical methodology allays concerns of
endogeneity as recipe and spillover groups are very similar to the control
group.
It was theoretically ambiguous if the food expenditure would increase
or decrease after receiving information due to a behavioral change in
childs dietary intake by the mother. We nd that there is a signicant
and large decrease in food expenditure in the spillover group. The de-
crease in food expenditure is equivalent to 29 percent for the mothers in
the spillover group. The resulting saving may lead to greater welfare for
the family, but the intra-household e¤ects need further probing. This
reduction in food expenditure does not seem to have any adverse impact
on child health.
Thus, policy makers should not merely judge the e¤ectiveness of
nutritional information campaigns by considering the impact it would
have on the direct beneciaries. Spillovers in learning and behavior are
likely to be an important source of the e¤ectiveness of such campaigns
and the determinants of such spillovers may include both environmental
and human factors as well as their interaction. In this paper, I am unable
28As spillover e¤ects can be di¤erent depending on the intensity of the intervention,
the results may not have external validity for other intensity levels. In particular,
the intensity that can be calculated as the ratio of total treated mothers to spillover
mothers (in slum clusters where at least one centre was in the spillover group) is
equal to 608/1001 or 60.7 percent.
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to address how, for instance, population density and proximity a¤ect
spillovers (due to unavailability of data). However, I do nd that being
literate does not lead to greater spillovers as the nutritional information
is transmitted orally. The spillovers cross the literacy barrier and thus,
assist in reducing the informational gap that is exacerbated between the
literate and the illiterate as a result of the informational treatment.
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Tables and Figures
Recipe Spillover Control Total
children weighed 1145 662 1231 3038
children whose mothers quizzed 1089 608 1207 2904
% children whose mothers quizzed 95 92 98 96
children weighed 964 577 1091 2632
children whose mothers quizzed 908 554 1053 2515
% children whose mothers quizzed 94 96 97 96
84 87 89 87
83 91 87 87
% children weighed again
% mothers quizzed again
Table 1: Compliance and attrition rates
Round 1
Round 2
VARIABLES Recipe Spillover Control Recipe Spillover
Weight (in kgs) 13.21  13.25 13.29 -0.03 -0.02
(1.84) (1.75) (1.86)
Grade (according to IAP) 4.17 4.21 4.21 -0.04 0.00
(0.78) (0.81) (0.78)
z-score (according to WHO, 2007) -1.7 -1.64 -1.66 -0.04 0.02
(0.76) (0.77) (0.78)
Malnutrition (according to WHO, 2007) .36 .33 .33 0.04 0.00
(.48) (.47) (.47)
Malnutrition (according to IAP) .62 0.57 .59 0.04 -0.03
(.49) (.50) (.49)
Quiz score (out of 20) 12.00   11.95   12.55 -0.13 -0.15
(3.25)  (3.05)  (2.55)
Age of child (in years)  4.28 4.26 4.27 0.01 -0.01
(.86) (.87) (.83)
Age of mother (in years) 28.39  28.37  28.53 -0.02 -0.03
(4.74) (4.47) (4.33)
Number of children 3.02  2.76  2.76 0.14 0.00
 (1.30)  (1.25)  (1.25)
Income (in Rs.)  3384 3284 3796 -0.18 -0.23
(1475)  (1420)  (1770)
Housewife .71 .79 .78 -0.11 0.02
(.45) (.41) (.41)
Fridge .25* .27* .45 -0.30 -0.27
(.43) (.45) (.50)
Mobile .65 .69 .69 -0.06 0.00
 (.47) (.46) (.46)
Water filter  .03 .04 .09 -0.18 -0.15
(.18) (.20) (.28)
Literate mother (can read) .41 .45 .50 -0.13 -0.07
( .49) (.50) (.50)
Educated worker (till at least A-level) .54 .60 .65 -0.16 -0.07
(.50) (.49) (.48)
                         Normalized Differences
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis. Grades calculated according to IAP (Indian Association of
Paediatricians) that is used in Anganwadis have been re-ordered from severely malnourished (1) to Normal (5).
Normalized differences are calculated using the formula as in Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for a scale-free
measure of the difference in distributions. A rule of thumb is that when normalized difference exceeds 0.25 in
absolute value, linear regression methods tend to be sensitive to the specification (Imbens and Rubin (2007)).
* indicates a normalized difference exceeding 0.25.
Table 2: Summary statistics from the baseline
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Table 3: Quiz score and its components
VARIABLES Quiz
Score
Recipe
Score
Non-recipe
Score
Quizscore
Score
Recipe
Score
Non-recipe
Score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 0.041 -0.208 0.249* 0.100 -0.181 0.281**
(0.291) (0.200) (0.130) (0.293) (0.211) (0.127)
Recipe -0.452 -0.473* 0.021 -0.560 -0.530* -0.030
(0.367) (0.274) (0.143) (0.394) (0.295) (0.154)
Spillover -0.570 -0.571** 0.001 -0.677 -0.628** -0.049
(0.439) (0.274) (0.198) (0.456) (0.302) (0.203)
Post*Recipe 1.283*** 1.093*** 0.190 1.268*** 1.144*** 0.124
(0.402) (0.293) (0.165) (0.423) (0.312) (0.165)
Post*Spillover 0.977* 0.870** 0.107 0.905* 0.792** 0.114
(0.539) (0.352) (0.230) (0.527) (0.356) (0.219)
p-value (Post*Recipe-
Post*Spillover=0)
0.567 0.535 0.704 0.500 0.341 0.961
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Constant 12.522*** 7.501*** 5.021*** 13.283*** 7.993*** 5.290***
(0.205) (0.140) (0.096) (0.652) (0.498) (0.260)
Observations 8824 8824 8824 7335 7335 7335
R-squared 0.066 0.079 0.025 0.083 0.101 0.040
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the Anganwadi level. Quiz score is out of 20 where recipe
and non-recipe scores are out of 13 and 7 respectively. The recipe score accounts for questions related directly to
information in the recipe book. Also included in the regression but not shown are other treatment dummies (incentive
and combined) and their interactions with Post. Other controls include: Age of mother, Proportion kitchen, Proportion
nonkitchen, No. of siblings of the child, adult members in household, and the following dummy variables: Mother is
housewife, Electricity in Anganwadi, Fan in Anganwadi, Blackboard in Anganwadi, Drinking water in Anganwadi,
Mother is Hindu, Grandmother at home, High experienced worker (if experience of the worker is more than the
median experience), Literate mother (if the mother can read), Literate father, High educated worker (at least till after
A-level), Worker is very satisfied with work, Worker is very satisfied with life. Proportion kitchen means proportion
of kitchen assets owned. Kitchen assets are fridge, water filter, water tap, cooking gas and pressure cooker.
Nonkitchen assets are mobile, television, scooter, radio and a flush toilet. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Diet (at least twice a week)
VARIABLES Green Veg Egg Sweet Porridge Green Veg Egg Sweet Porridge
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post -0.077 -0.132*** -0.074*** -0.158** -0.085 -0.135*** -0.077*** -0.166**
(0.055) (0.030) (0.027) (0.066) (0.055) (0.032) (0.028) (0.068)
Recipe 0.040 0.067* 0.037 0.157*** 0.022 0.051 0.039 0.165***
(0.050) (0.040) (0.032) (0.051) (0.046) (0.045) (0.036) (0.050)
Spillover 0.047 0.006 -0.006 0.123* 0.037 -0.003 0.021 0.116*
(0.059) (0.038) (0.036) (0.067) (0.058) (0.045) (0.041) (0.070)
Post*Recipe 0.063 0.077* 0.041 0.131* 0.057 0.063 0.052 0.138*
(0.069) (0.041) (0.041) (0.078) (0.072) (0.045) (0.044) (0.082)
Post*Spillover 0.040 0.080* 0.012 0.221*** 0.041 0.060 0.004 0.206**
(0.076) (0.042) (0.036) (0.084) (0.075) (0.046) (0.041) (0.087)
p-value (Post*Recipe-
Post*Spillover=0)
0.943 0.457 0.177 0.819 0.951 0.561 0.288 0.338
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.752*** 0.228*** 0.128*** 0.644*** 0.587*** 0.469*** 0.087 0.608***
(0.046) (0.026) (0.025) (0.044) (0.089) (0.080) (0.055) (0.106)
Observations 8882 8882 8882 8882 7376 7376 7376 7376
R-squared 0.021 0.026 0.041 0.046 0.042 0.046 0.065 0.083
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the Anganwadi level. Green Veg, Egg, Sweet and Porridge are dummy variables equal
to one when their intake by the child is on average at least twice a week and 0 otherwise based on mother’s recall data from the past three
months. Also included in the regression but not shown are other treatment dummies (incentive and combined) and their interactions with Post.
Other controls include: Age of mother, Proportion kitchen, Proportion nonkitchen, No. of siblings of the child, adult members in household,
and the following dummy variables: Mother is housewife, Electricity in Anganwadi, Fan in Anganwadi, Blackboard in Anganwadi, Drinking
water in Anganwadi, Mother is Hindu, Grandmother at home, High experienced worker (if experience of the worker is more than the median
experience), Literate mother (if the mother can read), Literate father, High educated worker (at least till after A-level), Worker is very satisfied
with work, Worker is very satisfied with life. Proportion kitchen means proportion of kitchen assets owned. Kitchen assets are fridge, water
filter, water tap, cooking gas and pressure cooker. Nonkitchen assets are mobile, television, scooter, radio and a flush toilet. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Food expenditure
VARIABLES Food exp Food exp
(1) (2)
Post 79.615*** 86.226***
(18.721) (18.836)
Recipe -21.111 -20.427
(23.534) (26.303)
Spillover -25.294 -50.438
(38.160) (35.059)
Post*Recipe -66.182** -74.241***
(26.884) (28.320)
Post*Spillover -111.353*** -120.938***
(32.976) (35.040)
p-value (Post*Recipe-
Post*Spillover=0)
0.177 0.201
Other controls Yes
Constant 442.417*** 406.558***
(13.849) (48.588)
Observations 8759 7286
R-squared 0.055 0.091
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the Anganwadi level.
Food expenditure is measured by asking the mother, “On average, what is the
weekly expenditure on food for the household?”Also included in the regression
but not shown are other treatment dummies (incentive and combined) and their
interactions with Post. Other controls include: Age of mother, Proportion
kitchen, Proportion nonkitchen, No. of siblings of the child, adult members in
household, and the following dummy variables: Mother is housewife,
Electricity in Anganwadi, Fan in Anganwadi, Blackboard in Anganwadi,
Drinking water in Anganwadi, Mother is Hindu, Grandmother at home, High
experienced worker (if experience of the worker is more than the median
experience), Literate mother (if the mother can read), Literate father, High
educated worker (at least till after A-level), Worker is very satisfied with work,
Worker is very satisfied with life. Proportion kitchen means proportion of
kitchen assets owned. Kitchen assets are fridge, water filter, water tap, cooking
gas and pressure cooker. Nonkitchen assets are mobile, television, scooter, radio
and a flush toilet.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 6: Results on weight, grade, z-score and malnourished status
VARIABLES Weight Grade z-score Malnourished Weight Grade z-score Malnourished
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post 0.275*** -0.051* -0.048** 0.036** 0.230*** -0.068** -0.076*** 0.037**
(0.049) (0.027) (0.024) (0.015) (0.057) (0.032) (0.028) (0.017)
Recipe -0.012 -0.010 -0.013 0.021 0.029 0.099** 0.084* -0.030
(0.112) (0.046) (0.048) (0.028) (0.116) (0.044) (0.047) (0.029)
Spillover -0.012 0.007 0.021 0.006 0.016 0.094* 0.100** -0.027
(0.115) (0.044) (0.046) (0.032) (0.121) (0.050) (0.050) (0.038)
Post*Recipe -0.017 0.009 -0.003 -0.019 0.045 0.015 0.026 -0.016
(0.073) (0.042) (0.035) (0.023) (0.083) (0.050) (0.040) (0.026)
Post*Spillover -0.120 -0.048 -0.052 0.003 0.010 -0.013 0.013 -0.012
(0.105) (0.048) (0.048) (0.026) (0.087) (0.045) (0.041) (0.029)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 13.268*** 4.203*** -1.674*** 0.327*** 11.906*** 3.770*** -2.092*** 0.525***
(0.082) (0.032) (0.032) (0.019) (0.480) (0.159) (0.167) (0.084)
Observations 9328 9328 9328 9328 7218 7218 7218 7218
R-squared 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.026 0.026 0.033 0.020
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the Anganwadi level. Grades have been ordered from very severely malnourished (1) to
normal (5) according to the thresholds used in the Anganwadis. Weight-for-age z-score for each child has been calculated using the following
formula from WHO Reference (2007):
(observed weight –median weight-for-age from reference population)/(Std. deviation of weight-for-age from reference population)
Malnourished status is a dummy which takes value 1 if child is malnourished according to WHO classification (if z-score < -2). Also included in
the regression but not shown are other treatment dummies (incentive and combined) and their interactions with Post. Other controls include: Age
of mother, Proportion kitchen, Proportion nonkitchen, Household Income, Food expenditure, No. of siblings of the child, adult members in
household, and the following dummy variables: Mother is housewife, Electricity in Anganwadi, Fan in Anganwadi, Blackboard in Anganwadi,
Drinking water in Anganwadi, Mother is Hindu, Grandmother at home, High quiz score mother (if mother’s quiz score at baseline was above
median), High experienced worker (if experience of the worker is more than the median experience), Literate mother (if the mother can read),
Literate father, High educated worker (at least till after A-level), Worker is very satisfied with work, Worker is very satisfied with life. Proportion
kitchen means proportion of kitchen assets owned. Kitchen assets are fridge, water filter, water tap, cooking gas and pressure cooker. Nonkitchen
assets are mobile, television, scooter, radio and a flush toilet. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Heterogeneous effects on weight-for-age z-score, quiz score and food expenditure if mother can read
VARIABLES z-score z-score Quiz Score Quiz Score Food exp Food exp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post -0.044 -0.039 0.348 0.505* 73.086*** 76.922***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.307) (0.296) (20.283) (21.067)
Recipe -0.016 0.077 0.091 -0.061 -4.633 -6.287
(0.045) (0.048) (0.421) (0.467) (25.783) (29.809)
Spillover 0.024 0.078 -0.369 -0.532 11.155 -24.019
(0.052) (0.057) (0.440) (0.500) (43.925) (38.791)
Post*Recipe -0.034 -0.044 0.823* 0.836* -51.981* -52.757
(0.041) (0.044) (0.449) (0.464) (30.182) (32.562)
Post*Spillover -0.109* -0.062 0.710 0.756 -126.193*** -124.789***
(0.061) (0.047) (0.556) (0.574) (37.847) (41.801)
Mother can read*Post*Recipe 0.080 0.131** 0.962** 0.888* -45.308 -49.665
(0.056) (0.061) (0.436) (0.462) (39.167) (44.100)
Mother can read*Post*Spillover 0.132* 0.129* 0.386 0.295 6.848 8.205
(0.078) (0.073) (0.398) (0.401) (37.682) (40.736)
p-value of combined effect
(Post*Spillover + Mother can
read*Post*Spillover=0)
0.719 0.241 0.054 0.055 0.001 0.003
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Constant -1.727*** -2.043*** 12.085*** 12.892*** 428.104*** 394.058***
(0.031) (0.139) (0.198) (0.641) (15.754) (47.101)
Observations 8692 7375 8445 7335 8385 7286
R-squared 0.011 0.031 0.075 0.088 0.063 0.096
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the Anganwadi level. Weight-for-age z-score for each child has been calculated using the
following formula from WHO Reference (2007). Quiz score is out of 20 where recipe and non-recipe scores are out of 13 and 7 respectively. Food
expenditure is measured by asking the mother, “On average, what is the weekly expenditure on food for the household?” Also included in the regression
but not shown are other treatment dummies (incentive and combined) and their interactions with Post, Mother can read dummy and its pair-wise
interactions with Post as well as all the treatments, and its triple interaction with Post and other treatment dummies (incentive and combined). Other
controls include: Age of mother, Proportion kitchen, Proportion nonkitchen, No. of siblings of the child, adult members in household, and the following
dummy variables: Mother is housewife, Electricity in Anganwadi, Fan in Anganwadi, Blackboard in Anganwadi, Drinking water in Anganwadi, Mother
is Hindu, Grandmother at home, High experienced worker (if experience of the worker is more than the median experience), Literate father, High
educated worker (at least till after A-level), Worker is very satisfied with work, Worker is very satisfied with life. Proportion kitchen means proportion of
kitchen assets owned. Kitchen assets are fridge, water filter, water tap, cooking gas and pressure cooker. Nonkitchen assets are mobile, television,
scooter, radio and a flush toilet. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 1: Map of Chandigarh showing location of Anganwadis under
treatment, spillover and control groups.
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Appendix
VARIABLES Recipe Spillover Control Recipe Spillover
Weight (in kgs) 12.94  13.26 13.49 -0.21 -0.09
(1.88) ( 1.91) (1.83)
Grade (according to IAP) 4.04 4.21 4.27 -0.21 -0.05
(0.83) (0.85) (0.75)
z-score (according to WHO, 2007) -1.77 -1.56 -1.58 -0.18 0.02
(0.80) (0.92) (0.72)
Malnutrition (according to WHO, 2007) .38 .33 .29 0.14 0.06
(.49) (.47) (.45)
Malnutrition (according to IAP) .67 .54 .56 0.16 -0.03
(.47) (.50) (.50)
Quiz score (out of 20) 11.64   11.94   12.74 -0.29 -0.21
(3.07)  (3.00)  (2.26)
Age of child (in years)  4.22 4.24 4.21 0.01 0.02
(.89) (.90) (.83)
Age of mother (in years) 27.29  29.11  27.88 -0.10 0.21
(4.18) (4.47) (3.91)
Number of siblings 0.55 0.52  0.52 0.02 0.00
 (1.30)  (1.00)  (0.87)
Income (in Rs.)  3326 3281 4021 -0.25 -0.27
(1580)  (1628)  (2263)
Housewife .53 .63 .49 0.06 0.20
(.50) (.48) (.50)
Fridge .23 .23 .35 -0.19 -0.19
(.42) (.43) (.48)
Mobile .70 .67 .67 0.05 0.00
 (.46) (.47) (.47)
Water filter  .02 .03 .06 -0.14 -0.10
(.15) (.18) (.24)
Literate mother (can read) .37 .37 .48 -0.16 -0.16
( .48) (.49) (.50)
Table A1: Summary statistics from the baseline of attrited sample
Normalized
Differences
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis. Grades calculated according to IAP (Indian
Association of Paediatricians) that is used in Anganwadis have been re-ordered from severely
malnourished (1) to Normal (5). Normalized differences are calculated using the formula as in
Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for a scale-free measure of the difference in distributions. A
rule of thumb is that when normalized difference exceeds 0.25 in absolute value, linear
regression methods tend to be sensitive to the specification (Imbens and Rubin (2007)).
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Table A2: Heterogeneous effects on z-score and quiz score if father can read
VARIABLES z-score z-score Quiz Score Quiz Score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post -0.060 -0.069* 0.056 0.011
(0.042) (0.041) (0.389) (0.401)
Recipe 0.060 0.054 0.264 0.025
(0.070) (0.064) (0.553) (0.568)
Spillover 0.078 0.114 0.052 -0.162
(0.084) (0.100) (0.446) (0.484)
Post*Recipe -0.017 -0.002 0.892 0.881
(0.053) (0.054) (0.593) (0.611)
Post*Spillover -0.079 -0.016 0.446 0.600
(0.097) (0.064) (0.592) (0.600)
Father can read*Post*Recipe 0.032 0.023 0.611 0.599
(0.059) (0.062) (0.533) (0.524)
Father can read*Post*Spillover 0.051 0.021 0.589 0.382
(0.091) (0.078) (0.437) (0.439)
p-value of combined effect
(Post*Spillover + Father can
read*Post*Spillover=0)
0.520 0.914 0.050 0.074
Other controls Yes Yes
Constant -1.802*** -1.936*** 12.196*** 13.441***
(0.046) (0.178) (0.296) (0.898)
Observations 8792 7385 8557 7345
R-squared 0.010 0.022 0.071 0.087
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the Anganwadi level. Father can read is a
dummy equal to 1 if father can read. Weight-for-age z-score for each child has been calculated using
the following formula from WHO Reference (2007). Quiz score is out of 20 where recipe and non-
recipe scores are out of 13 and 7 respectively. Also included in the regression but not shown are
other treatment dummies (incentive and combined) and their interactions with Post, Father can read
dummy and its pair-wise interactions with Post as well as all the treatments, and its triple interaction
with Post and other treatment dummies (incentive and combined). Other controls include: Age of
mother, adult members in household, and the following dummy variables: Mother is housewife,
Electricity in Anganwadi, Fan in Anganwadi, Blackboard in Anganwadi, Drinking water in
Anganwadi, Mother is Hindu, Grandmother at home, High experienced worker (if experience of the
worker is more than the median experience), Literate mother (if the mother can read), High educated
worker (at least till after A-level), Worker is very satisfied with work, Worker is very satisfied with
life. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A3: Heterogeneous effects on weight-for-age z-score, quiz score and food expenditure of owning kitchen
assets
VARIABLES z-score z-score Quiz Score Quiz Score Food exp Food exp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 0.020 0.024 1.034** 0.951* 81.782** 72.427**
(0.069) (0.075) (0.493) (0.484) (34.241) (34.996)
Recipe 0.095 0.118 1.874*** 1.748*** 90.244** 67.975
(0.103) (0.112) (0.620) (0.617) (42.923) (41.441)
Spillover 0.211* 0.186 0.908 0.767 158.828** 119.014*
(0.116) (0.137) (0.556) (0.572) (70.364) (67.152)
Post*Recipe -0.151* -0.138 -0.902 -0.830 -31.485 0.872
(0.084) (0.091) (0.661) (0.679) (54.073) (52.937)
Post*Spillover -0.182 -0.111 -0.242 0.121 -190.994*** -196.523**
(0.118) (0.091) (0.728) (0.755) (69.019) (75.948)
Proportion kitchen*Post*Recipe 0.302** 0.285* 4.222*** 4.126*** -85.365 -157.601*
(0.143) (0.157) (1.020) (1.001) (89.337) (92.694)
Proportion kitchen*Post*Spillover 0.267 0.196 1.802 1.281 141.890 156.967
(0.172) (0.152) (1.249) (1.275) (106.691) (115.071)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Constant -1.971*** -2.032*** 11.321*** 12.256*** 370.622*** 353.758***
(0.086) (0.192) (0.423) (0.904) (34.643) (52.184)
Observations 8478 7375 8427 7335 8368 7286
R-squared 0.018 0.028 0.087 0.097 0.088 0.112
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the Anganwadi level. Proportion kitchen means proportion of kitchen assets owned.
Kitchen assets are fridge, water filter, water tap, cooking gas and pressure cooker. Weight-for-age z-score for each child has been calculated
using the following formula from WHO Reference (2007). Quiz score is out of 20 where recipe and non-recipe scores are out of 13 and 7
respectively. Food expenditure is measured by asking the mother, “On average, what is the weekly expenditure on food for the household?”
Also included in the regression but not shown are other treatment dummies (incentive and combined) and their interactions with Post,
Proportion kitchen and its pair-wise interactions with Post as well as all the treatments, and its triple interaction with Post and other treatment
dummies (incentive and combined). Other controls include: Age of mother, adult members in household, and the following dummy
variables: Mother is housewife, Electricity in Anganwadi, Fan in Anganwadi, Blackboard in Anganwadi, Drinking water in Anganwadi,
Mother is Hindu, Grandmother at home, High experienced worker (if experience of the worker is more than the median experience), Literate
mother (if the mother can read), Literate father, High educated worker (at least till after A-level), Worker is very satisfied with work, Worker
is very satisfied with life. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A4: Heterogeneous effects on weight-for-age z-score, quiz score and food expenditure of owning non-kitchen assets
VARIABLES z-score z-score Quiz Score Quiz Score Food exp Food exp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post -0.055 -0.101** 0.230 -0.131 129.410*** 119.175***
(0.048) (0.050) (0.547) (0.552) (36.488) (34.102)
Recipe 0.084 0.084 0.619 0.297 54.992 31.577
(0.085) (0.084) (0.650) (0.680) (40.007) (42.600)
Spillover -0.058 -0.065 0.372 -0.098 45.322 8.280
(0.079) (0.090) (0.675) (0.682) (63.642) (59.247)
Post*Recipe -0.014 0.031 0.705 1.169 -110.231** -70.456
(0.065) (0.067) (0.684) (0.720) (49.863) (47.337)
Post*Spillover 0.011 0.052 0.400 1.109 -160.306** -157.061**
(0.082) (0.064) (0.759) (0.782) (70.329) (73.946)
Proportion non-kitchen*Post*Recipe 0.040 -0.024 1.174 0.351 68.085 -25.910
(0.115) (0.119) (1.050) (1.042) (88.236) (92.643)
Proportion non-kitchen*Post*Spillover -0.119 -0.099 1.054 -0.357 66.629 68.151
(0.136) (0.127) (1.323) (1.250) (127.237) (130.335)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Constant -1.872*** -1.948*** 11.945*** 13.307*** 372.172*** 374.004***
(0.058) (0.179) (0.501) (0.986) (31.288) (51.734)
Observations 8890 7385 8638 7345 8577 7296
R-squared 0.015 0.027 0.074 0.087 0.064 0.088
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the Anganwadi level. Proportion non-kitchen means proportion of non-kitchen
assets owned. Non-kitchen assets are mobile, television, scooter, radio and a flush toilet. Weight-for-age z-score for each child has been
calculated using the following formula from WHO Reference (2007). Quiz score is out of 20 where recipe and non-recipe scores are out of
13 and 7 respectively. Food expenditure is measured by asking the mother, “On average, what is the weekly expenditure on food for the
household?”Also included in the regression but not shown are other treatment dummies (incentive and combined) and their interactions with
Post, Proportion non-kitchen and its pair-wise interactions with Post as well as all the treatments, and its triple interaction with Post and other
treatment dummies (incentive and combined). Other controls include: Age of mother, adult members in household, and the following dummy
variables: Mother is housewife, Electricity in Anganwadi, Fan in Anganwadi, Blackboard in Anganwadi, Drinking water in Anganwadi,
Mother is Hindu, Grandmother at home, High experienced worker (if experience of the worker is more than the median experience), Literate
mother (if the mother can read), Literate father, High educated worker (at least till after A-level), Worker is very satisfied with work, Worker
is very satisfied with life. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A5: Quantity and Content of Social interaction
VARIABLES Worker visits
Reported by
Mother
Worker visits
Reported by
Worker
Worker visits
Reported by
Mother
Worker visits
Reported by
Worker
Talked
about
Diet
Talked about
Consequences of
Malnutrition
Talked
about
Diet
Talked about
Consequences of
Malnutrition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post -1.989*** -1.086* -2.125*** -1.234* -0.014 -0.066 -0.003 -0.083
(0.476) (0.655) (0.514) (0.677) (0.018) (0.049) (0.013) (0.051)
Recipe -2.137*** -1.801** -2.376*** -2.303*** -0.037* -0.071 -0.037* -0.076
(0.561) (0.733) (0.624) (0.808) (0.020) (0.050) (0.020) (0.052)
Spillover -1.827*** -0.043 -2.321*** -1.021 -0.043 -0.059 -0.037 -0.084
(0.602) (1.117) (0.641) (1.143) (0.029) (0.064) (0.026) (0.063)
Post*Recipe 2.407*** 1.113 2.596*** 1.345 0.010 0.099 0.007 0.090
(0.541) (0.766) (0.586) (0.815) (0.039) (0.072) (0.031) (0.073)
Post*Spillover 1.757*** 0.281 2.183*** 0.832 0.023 0.044 -0.018 0.067
(0.549) (1.056) (0.572) (1.139) (0.044) (0.095) (0.043) (0.096)
p-value
(Post*Recipe-
Post*Spillover=0)
0.367 0.084 0.614 0.273 0.807 0.572 0.619 0.812
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 5.565*** 5.724*** 7.132*** 7.290*** 0.964*** 0.839*** 0.960*** 0.959***
(0.522) (0.609) (1.051) (1.589) (0.011) (0.037) (0.042) (0.094)
Observations 8881 9084 7375 7201 8882 8881 7376 7375
R-squared 0.096 0.214 0.115 0.306 0.015 0.018 0.028 0.049
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the Anganwadi level. Dependent Variables are all dummy variables that take value 1 if the
worker talked to the mother in the past 3 months on these topics as reported by the mother. Also included in the regression but not shown are other
treatment dummies (incentive and combined) and their interactions with Post. Other controls include: Age of mother, Proportion kitchen, Proportion
nonkitchen, No. of siblings of the child, adult members in household, and the following dummy variables: Mother is housewife, Electricity in
Anganwadi, Fan in Anganwadi, Blackboard in Anganwadi, Drinking water in Anganwadi, Mother is Hindu, Grandmother at home, High
experienced worker (if experience of the worker is more than the median experience), Literate mother (if the mother can read), Literate father, High
educated worker (at least till after A-level), Worker is very satisfied with work, Worker is very satisfied with life. Proportion kitchen means
proportion of kitchen assets owned. Kitchen assets are fridge, water filter, water tap, cooking gas and pressure cooker. Nonkitchen assets are mobile,
television, scooter, radio and a flush toilet. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
10. BANANA PIE:
Ingredients:
Banana ripe 100g.
Wheat flour 100 g.
Sugar 50 g.
Salt to taste
Oil 50 ml.
Method of preparation:
1. Add salt and sugar to wheat flour.
2. Mash Banana and mix with flour.
3. Kneed it into a stiff dough.
4. Divide the dough into small balls.
5. Shape each ball into small pies.
6. Heat tawa and grease it with a little oil.
7. Apply oil from sides of pie and cook till golden brown (shallow fry).
Nutritive values per 100 Gms.
Calories 402
Protein 4.4 g.
Iron 1.7 mg.
Carotene 37 microg.
Figure A1
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Figure A2: Proportion who consume porridge at least twice a week
according to number of siblings
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Figure A3: Proportion who consume sweets at least twice a week
according to number of siblings
33
